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Abstract
The paper analyzes gross upward pricing pressure indices called iGUPPI to assess the ef-
fects of a merger between vertically integrated firms where in the downstream market also
independent rivals are active. Such indices could be used e.g. to screen mergers between
mobile network operators which compete with mobile virtual network operators in the
downstream retail market. It is shown that the iGUPPI for the downstream market corre-
sponds to the sum of two well-known upward pricing pressure indices, the GUPPI concept
of Salop/Moresi (2009) and the vGUPPI concept of Moresi/Salop (2013). Such a simple
decomposition however does not hold for the upstream market a priori. Here, additional
effects arise which are not included by the two concepts. Further assumptions on the price
reactions of the downstream divisions to increases in the input prices are imposed so that
the iGUPPI for the upstream market allows for a decomposition into an upstream market
version of the GUPPI and the vGUPPI.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, competition authorities have made a fundamental shift in their
approach to evaluating mergers in markets with differentiated products where firms compete
with prices. In the past, merger effects were assessed almost exclusively by market shares and
the change in market shares caused by the merger. This approach requires the definition of the
relevant market. The standard procedure to identify a market is the so-called SSNIP test.1 In
markets with differentiated products however, this approach usually proves to be problematic
for at least three reasons: First, if there are no gaps in the chain of substitution, procedures
like the SSNIP test tend to define markets too broadly thus generating small market shares
and underestimating market power. Second, market definition classifies products as either “in
the market” or “out of the market” which implies that all products in the relevant market are
perfect substitutes while products not in the relevant market impose no competitive constraints
at all on the products in the relevant market. In the case of differentiated products however,
the intensity of competition is far more important – a merger of firms whose products are close
substitutes will usually have very different effects on the market outcome as compared with
a merger of two firms producing distant substitutes even if the markets shares are the same
in both cases. Finally, this approach is based on the premise that there exists a positive rela-
tionship between market concentration and market power. However, it might be questionable
whether such a relationship holds for markets with differentiated products.
In view of these difficulties, two alternative approaches to assessing mergers have been taken
on in merger analysis, merger simulation and upward pricing pressure measures. Merger simu-
lation usually requires the estimation of a complex demand system. The marginal costs of the
firms are recovered from this estimated demand system and specific assumptions on the mode
of competition (e.g. Bertrand competition).2 In the final stage, the recovered marginal costs
and the estimated demand parameters are used to simulate the price effects of a merger. A
shortcoming of this approach is that the predicted price effects are very sensitive to the spec-
ified demand system. It depends on the curvature of the demand functions how much of any
efficiency gains induced by the merger are passed on to the price paid by the consumers. More-
over, there is the practical issue that in-depth merger simulations are difficult to implement in
the short amount of time available for the merger review.
The upward pricing pressure approach suggested by Salop/Moresi (2009) and Farell/Shapiro
(2010a) tries to assess the impact of a merger directly by considering the incentives of the
merging firms to raise the price of one of its products. The intensity of this incentive is
measured by the so-called gross upward pricing pressure index. Its construction is related to
1The Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test identifies the relevant market
by determining whether a profit-maximizing hypothetical monopolist in the candidate market would raise the
product prices significantly, typically by 5 to 10 percent for at least one year, above their current levels. For a
survey on the different ways to define relevant markets see OECD (2012).
2A a comprehensive survey classifying the various approaches in merger simulation is provided in Budzin-
ski/Ruhmer (2010) or Schwalbe/Zimmer (2009).
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an idea of Werden (1996). The value of such an index gives the amount of the reduction in the
marginal cost required for offsetting the incentive of a merging partner to increase the price
of its product due the recapture of the other merging partner. This approach avoids some
of the problems concerning the definition of the relevant market and merger simulation. In
some merger cases, it turns out that upward pricing pressure indices are easier to implement
than the other two approaches. Moreover, these indicies take into account the intensity of
competition prevailing between the two firms before their merger by specifying the diversion
ratio of their products. The diversion ratio between two products A and B indicates the
fraction of product A’s lost sales that would be diverted to B in case of an increase in the price
of A.3 Obviously, the higher the diversion ratio, the more intense is the competition between
the two products. Finally, the problem of the demand curvature with which merger simulation
is plagued is circumvented by construction since upward pricing pressure indices are calculated
at the pre-merger prices.4
The first type of gross upward pricing pressure indices has been introduced by Salop/Moresi
(2009). They analyze the standard GUPPI which measures the incentive of a horizontal merger
between two single-product firms to increase its prices.5 Meanwhile, these indices have been
utilized by several competition authorities like the EU Commission or the Federal Trade Com-
mission in their merger reviews. In academic literature, Baltzopoulos et. al. (2015) have
applied this index to several merger cases in Sweden and Sørgard (2012) has used the index
to asses the price effects of a acquisition in the Norwegian grocery market. Moreover, variants
of this concept has been suggested which are applicable to other types of mergers and market
conditions. Willig (2011) has extended the standard GUPPI to cases in which the merger causes
quality changes in the products and to partial acquisitions, i.e. to cases in which a firm ac-
quires only a partial equity stake of another firm. The adjusted gross upward pricing pressure
index of Neurohr (2016) incorporates cases in which the firms are confronted with capacity
constraints or kinked demand curves. Affelt et al. (2013) has derived gross upward pricing
pressure indices to assess mergers of platforms. The vGUPPI concept of Moresi/Salop (2013)
measures the incentives of vertical mergers to increase the prices of their intermediate and final
products. To the best or our knowledge, however, there is one type of merger which has not
yet been covered in the upward pricing pressure literature although several of such mergers has
been extensively scrutinized by competition authorities in recent years. In this paper, we aim
to fill this gap. Our objective is to derive gross upward pricing pressure indices called iGUPPI
for mergers of vertically integrated firms.
In the last decade, this type of merger has occurred particularly in the telecommunication sector
3Market shares in a differentiated product market are an indicator of the intensity of competition only to the
extent that they are proportional to the diversion ratio. This, however, holds only under the special condition
that all products in the relevant market are “equally differentiated” as has been shown by Willig (1991).
4The commonalities and differences between merger simulation and the upward pricing pressure approach
are discussed in Epstein/Rubinfeld (2010) and Farell/Shapiro (2010b).
5The derivation of the GUPPI from the profit maximization problem of the merged firm is concisely described
e.g. in Baltzopoulos et. al. (2015), Moresi (2010) and Willig (2011).
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when two mobile network operators (MNO) merged. Such operators have their own network
infrastructure and are active on two stages of the supply chain, the provisions of network
services upstream and telecommunication services downstream. In the upstream stage, they
offer network access to independent mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) which have
no own network infrastructure and are thus dependent on network access to supply telephone
services in the downstream retail market. Here, the MVNOs compete with the MNOs who
also offer retail services. Prominent examples of mergers of MNOs in Europe are: Hutchison
3G Austria/Orange Austria in 2012, Hutchsion 3G UK/Telefo´nica Ireland in 2014, Telefo´nica
Deutschland/E-Plus in 2014, Hutchsion 3G UK/Telefo´nica UK in 2016. Our iGUPPI concept
aims to asses the pressure induced by such merger on the upstream and downstream prices.
Interestingly, the European Commission has applied the GUPPI concept of Salop/Moresi (2009)
on the above mentioned mergers to asses the pressure caused by the merger on the downstream
retail prices.6 The question arises whether the GUPPI concept is still an appropriate measure
of the pricing pressure even if the merging firms operate on two stages of the supply chain.
As will be shown in this paper, this might lead to an (possibly substantial) underestimation
of the actual pricing pressure. The reason is that there are additional pricing pressure effects
not captured by the GUPPI for this kind of mergers. If a merging partner A increase one of
its downstream prices, then the other merging partner B profits from the recapture in the
downstream market as former customers of A switch to B. This recapture constitutes the
horizontal pricing pressure of the merger. The standard GUPPI includes this pricing pressure.
However, the increase in the downstream price of A also boosts the demand of the downstream
competitors of A and B. As some of them source intermediate goods from the vertically
integrated firm B, the demand for these goods might increase. Firm B might thus experience
also a rise of its profits in the upstream market. This recapture constitutes the vertical pricing
pressure of the merger. This effect is ignored whenever the GUPPI concept is applied on mergers
of vertically integrated firms.
In our paper, we analyze iGUPPIs for the upstream and downstream market prices charged by
the merged firm. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage differentiated Bertrand competition
game with imperfect information. Such a game has been used in Moresi/Salop (2013) for
the derivation of the vGUPPI concept which captures the incentives to increase prices if two
firms operating at different levels of a supply chain merge. According to the upward pricing
pressure methodology, the reference point of our derivation is the situation pre-meger which
we assume is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. It turns out that our iGUPPI with
respect to the downstream prices corresponds to the sum of the standard GUPPI and the
vGUPPI. Unfortunately, such a simple decomposition is generally not possible for our iGUPPI
with respect to the upstream prices. The reason is that an increases in a price set by the
upstream division of some merging partner triggers two price reactions in the downstream
6See for example EU merger case no COMP/M.7018 - Telefo´nica Deutschland/E-Plus, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/additional data/m7018 5501 3.pdf. For a discussion of the
competitive effects of this merger see Maier-Rigaud/Schwalbe (2015).
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market. The downstream division of this merging partner and the downstream competitor
whose input has become more expensive might adjust their downstream prices to this price
increase. The former price reaction is captured neither by the GUPPI concept nor by the vGUPPI
concept. Nonetheless, if one assumes that this price reaction is negligible, our iGUPPI becomes
decomposable in an upstream market variant of the GUPPI concept and the vGUPPI concept.
Presumably, the papers most similar to our paper are the ones of Ashjell et al. (2017) and
Bergh et al. (2017). They study the price effects caused by a horizontal merger with vertical
relations. The analysis of Bergh et al. (2017), who set up a more general market model than
Ashjell et al. (2017), includes the case of a merger between two vertically integrated firms.
However, the assumptions and objectives of these articles differ substantially to ours. First, the
two articles assume a specific functional form, or more precisely, a linear form of the demand
functions and analyze only the price effects caused by the merger in the downstream market.
More importantly, the analysis of Ashjell et al. (2017) and Bergh et al. (2017) consists of
comparative statics. It compares the prices pre-merger with ones post-merger. In contrast
to that, our paper follows the upward pricing pressure methodology and asses the intensity
of the incentives of the merged firm to increase its prices at the pre-merger level. Such an
analysis does not require the specification of prices post-merger and thus becomes immune to
the curvature of the demand function.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the framework of our analysis. In
section three, the situation pre-merger is characterized as a benchmark. The situation post
merger is discussed in section four. Here, the gross upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPI for
downstream and upstream prices are also derived. In section five, these indices are transformed
in a way so that they can be calculated using well-known economic concepts like diversion
ratios and profit margins. Moreover, a numerical example is presented in this section in order
to underscore the usefulness of our pricing pressure indices. For practitioners, it might be
sufficient to read only this section. Section six concludes.
2 The Setting
Our objective is to analyze the upward pricing pressure caused by a merger of two vertically
integrated firms. To accomplish this task, we consider a supply chain consisting of a upstream
and a downstream market. There are two vertically integrated firms, firm 1 and firm 2,
operating in both the upstream market and the downstreammarket. Without loss of generality,
we assume that there are no further competitors in the upstream market. In other words, the
two firms are the only suppliers for the firms in the downstream market. Besides the firms 1 and
2, there are several non-integrated competitors in the downstream market, manufacturers 3 to
7This advantage of the upward pricing pressure approach is extensively discussed in Schmalensee (2009).
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M .8 The mode of competition in both markets is that of a differentiated Bertrand competition.
Like in Moresi/Salop (2013), the price-setting process is modeled as a two-stage game. In the
first stage, each supplier i ∈ {1, 2} chooses its input prices wik charged to the non-integrated
manufacturers k ∈ {3, . . . ,M}. Input suppliers thus might set a different input price for each
downstream firm. We summarize the input prices of the supply chain by the input price vector
w := (w13 , . . . , w
1
M , w
2
3 , . . . , w
2
M ). The input prices chosen by supplier i are given by the vector
wi := (wi1, . . . , w
i
M ) and the input prices faced by the non-integrated manufacturer k are listed
by the pair wk := (w
1
k, w
2
k). In the second stage of our competition game, each manufacturer
k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} chooses its output price pk. These output prices are summarized by the output
price vector p := (p1, . . . , pM ).
The two-stage game is a game of imperfect information. Each non-integrated manufacturer
observes only the prices charged for its inputs. Such a manufacturer is not informed about the
input prices of the other manufacturers. This lack of information entails that the information
sets of a non-integrated manufacturer k are identifiable by the input price vector wk. The
manufacturer of the vertically integrated firm i knows all input prices charged by its upstream
division. Therefore, it is justified to identify the information set of the manufacturer of the
vertically integrated firm i by the input price vector wi.
Concerning the costs we assume that supplier i’s marginal costs might differ among the man-
ufacturers, e.g., because the delivery of the inputs to the manufactures causes different trans-
portation or service costs. However, supplier i’s marginal costs are assumed to be constant
with respect to the quantity delivered to the manufacturers. We denote henceforth by cik the
constant marginal cost of the input offered by supplier i to the non-integrated manufacturer
k. While each non-integrated manufacturer might combine inputs from different suppliers, the
downstream division of a vertically integrated firm i source all their inputs from its upstream
division at the transfer price equal to the constant marginal cost ci.
The technologies of all manufacturers exhibit constant scales of return so that the input coef-
ficients of the cost-minimizing manufacturers are independent of the quantity produced.9 We
denote henceforth manufacturer k’s production coefficient with respect to the input offered
by supplier i by Sik(w
1
k, w
2
k). This input coefficient gives the quantity of the input the non-
integrated manufacturer k sources from supplier i per unit of output produced at the input
prices (w1k, w
2
k). It is assumed that the input coefficient function S
i
k(·) is differentiable. Cost
minimization implies that this function is non-increasing in the input price wik charged by sup-
8The methodology behind the upward pricing pressure indices ensures that a more comprehensive market
structure would not affect the formulas of our indices. To see this, it is necessary to bear in mind that the
upward pricing pressure analysis is based on isolated price increases. While increasing one of the prices charged
by the merged firm, the prices set by the (other) suppliers remain unchanged. For this reason, the existence of
non-integrated upstream competitors does not affect the construction of the upward pricing pressure indices.
Moreover, the formulas of our indices remain also unchanged if there are additional manufacturers which are
upstream divisions of vertically integrated firms. As long as these vertically integrated firms source all their
inputs from their upstream divisions, an increase in one of the prices set by the merged firm is not observed by
them. Hence, such a price increase does not trigger price reactions of such firms.
9See also Proposition 5.C.2 (viii) in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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plier i and non-decreasing increases in the input price wjk charged by supplier j 6= i.
10 If both
Sik and S
j
k are constant and non-negative, the non-integrated manufacturer k is said to operate
with a fixed input ratio. Or putting it differently, the two inputs turn out to be perfectly
complementary in this case.
The demand for the product of manufacturer k at price vector p is denoted by Dk(p1, . . . , pM ).
We assume that the demand function Dk(.) for product k is differentiable. Moreover, it is
decreasing in its own price pk and increasing in the price pm of any other product m 6= k.
Notice that the latter assumption states that the other products are (imperfect) substitutes
to the product offered by manufacturer k. In mathematical terms, our assumptions on the
demand functions require that ∂Dk
∂pk
(p) < 0 and ∂Dk
∂pm
(p) > 0 hold for any (relevant) output
price vector p and any two different products k,m.
As done in Moresi/Salop (2013), our two-stage competition game is solved by the concept of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. One of its solutions is assumed to be the pre-merger situation.
This situation constitutes the starting point of the forthcoming upward pricing pressure analysis
of a merger between two vertically integrated firms. The intensity of the incentive of the
merged firm to increase its input and output prices is evaluated at the pre-merger equilibrium
price level. Optimality conditions for these prices are derived in the following section. In
line with standard terminology, we term our indices iGUPPI. Their construction is detailed
in the Sections four and five of this paper. These indices might be viewed as complementary
to the known GUPPI and vGUPPI concepts which have been designed by Salop/Moresi (2009)
and Moresi/Salop (2013) to measure the upward pricing pressure in the case of horizontal and
vertical mergers, respectively. The interpretation of our and their indices is the same. The
greater the value of such an index for some price, the stronger the incentive of the merged firm
to increase this price and, thus, the more anti-competitive the merger might be.
3 The Situation Pre-Merger
The reference point of pricing pressure indices is the economic situation before the merger.
To specify the upward pricing pressure induced by the merger of our two vertically integrated
firms 1 and 2, it is therefore necessary to characterize their economic situation pre-merger.
The situation pre-merger is assumed to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the two-stage
competition game we have described in the previous section. We denote henceforth by (wˆ, pˆ)
the price vector realized at this equilibrium. The equilibrium price strategy of manufacturers
k is denoted by pˆk(.). Such a mapping discloses the price charged by manufacturer k at each of
its information sets. We summarize henceforth these price strategies by the equilibrium price
strategy profile pˆ(.) where pˆ(w) := (pˆ1(w), . . . , pˆM (w)).
11 It gives the output prices charged
10See also Proposition 5.C.2 (vii) in Mas-Colell et. al. (1995).
11Without any loss of precision, we can write the equilibrium output price strategies of the manufactures as
functions of input price vector w even if the output prices of the non-integrated manufacturers k are unaffected
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by the manufactures for any input price vector w. In the subsequent paragraphs, we impose
several assumptions on the equilibrium price vector and the equilibrium price strategies of
the manufacturers.12 These assumptions apply throughout the paper and are used to infer
qualitative statements about our indices.
First, it is taken for granted that there is no cross subsidization at the equilibrium prices,
meaning any business relationship taken up by the integrated firms proves to be profitable.13
More precisely, we require that the equilibrium output price pˆi charged by some vertically
integrated firm i exceed the marginal cost ci and any equilibrium input price wˆ
i
k charged
by this firm exceed the marginal cost cik whenever its upstream division delivers inputs to
manufacturer k, i.e.
pˆi > ci and, if S
i
m(wˆ) > 0, then wˆ
i
m > c
i
m . (1)
In what follows, we also assume that the price strategies of the manufactures are differentiable.
In order to examine the impact of an increase in input price wik on the prices charged by
the manufacturers, we remark that according to the above assumptions on the manufacturers’
knowledge only two manufacturers observe this price increase, the downstream division of firm
i and the non-integrated manufacturer k. It is assumed that manufacturer k’s price strategy is
increasing in the input price wik as long as manufacturer k employs inputs offered by supplier
i. This assumption says that a non-integrated manufacturer passes on at least partially the
increase in the price of one of its inputs to the consumers of its product. Whenever the
manufacturer k does not employ inputs from the upstream division of firm i there will be
no price reactions, neither from manufacturer k nor from the downstream division of firm i.
Mathematically, these assumptions on the price reactions of the two firms are summarized as
follows:
if Sik(wk) > 0, then
∂pˆk
∂wik
(w) > 0, otherwise
∂pˆk
∂wik
(w) =
∂pˆi
∂wik
(w) = 0 . (2)
Because the other manufacturers do not observe the increase in input price wik their price
setting is unaffected by this price increase. For this reason, ∂pˆm
∂wi
k
(w) = 0 holds for any input
price vector w and for any manufacturer m different to i and k.
An increase in input price wik thus affects the demand for the output produced by manufacturer
m only in two ways, by a change in output price pk and by a change in output price pi. The
first transmission channel is henceforth called the direct price channel and the second one is
by w−k and that of the downstream subsidiaries i = 1, 2 are unaffected by w
−i.
12Notice that a complete analysis of the pre-merger situation would require to derive these properties instead
of simply assuming them. A full-fledged Bertrand competition model would be needed for such a derivation.
However, we abstain here from this issue because such a game theoretical exercise is beyond the objective of
this paper. We only note that our assumptions can be derived from a competition model in which (i) the
manufacturers are faced with linear demand functions and (ii) the firms have static beliefs, i.e., they believe
even at information sets off the equilibrium path that the competitors charge their equilibrium prices.
13We remark that this property might be violated in two-sided markets. In this case it could be profitable
for firms due to the indirect network effects to subsidize one side of consumers. This finding is detailed in the
analysis of Rochet and Tirole (2003). Upward pricing pressure indices for mergers in two-sided markets are
derived in Affeldt et al. (2013). Cosnita-Langlais et al. (2018) amend these indices to incorporate feedback
effects.
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called the indirect price channel. In what follows, we take for granted that whenever the effect
of the indirect price channel is counteracting the effect of the direct price channel, the latter
outweigh the former. We back up this assertion by imposing further two assumptions. First,
we suppose that the absolute size of the effect on the demand for product k through the direct
transmission channel exceeds the size of the effect on the demand for product k through the
indirect transmission channel, i.e.∣∣∣∣∂Dk∂pk (p)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(w)
∣∣∣∣ > ∂Dk∂pi (p)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(w) . (3)
Second, we suppose that the size of the effect on the demand for product m 6= k through the
direct transmission channel exceeds the absolute size of the effect on the demand for product
m through the indirect transmission, i.e.
∂Dm
∂pk
(p)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(w) >
∣∣∣∣∂Dm∂pi (p)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(w)
∣∣∣∣ . (4)
Summing up, our assumptions (2) to (4) ensure that, whenever the non-integrated manufac-
turer k employs the input offered by supplier i, an increase in the price of this input leads to
an decrease in the demand for product k, but to an increase in the demand for any substitute
m 6= k.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that the beliefs at the information sets crossing the
equilibrium path be consistent with the factual price decisions. This postulate implies the
following conjectures in our two-stage competition game. Each downstream division of a ver-
tically integrated firm i believes at information set wˆi that the upstream division of the other
vertically integrated firm j charges its equilibrium input prices wˆj . Each non-integrated man-
ufacturer k believes at information set wˆk that its non-integrated competitors are charged the
equilibrium input prices wˆ−k. The other requirement imposed by the perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium concept is that all players act sequentially rational at each of their information
sets. This entails for our two-stage competition game that each firm maximizes its expected
profits at each of its information sets. In what follows, we specify conditions on the equilibrium
input and output prices resulting from sequential rationality and the above conjectures.
As a first step, we examine the price setting in the downstream market. We begin with
considering the price strategy a vertically integrated firm i chooses in the downstream market.
The profit of such a firm is given by
πi(w, p) = (pi − ci)Di(p) +
M∑
m=3
(wim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wm)Dm(p).
Obviously, firm i’s profit depends on the output prices charged by all manufacturers as well
as on the input prices charged by all suppliers. The first term on the right-hand side of the
profit equation is the profit the vertically integrated firm i realizes in the downstream market
while the second term denotes the profit it realizes by selling inputs to the non-integrated
downstream competitors 3 to M .
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As mentioned above, firm i believes at information set wˆi that the other supplier j chooses
the equilibrium input price vector wˆj . Such a conjecture implies that firm i expects at this
information set that each competitor m in the downstream market chooses the equilibrium
output price pˆm = pˆm(wˆ). Because firm i acts sequentially rational, the following first-order
condition for a profit maximum with respect to output price pi
∂πi
∂pi
(wˆ, pˆ) = Di(pˆ) + (pˆi − ci)
∂Di
∂pi
(pˆ) +
M∑
m=3
(wˆim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wˆm)
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ) = 0 (5)
results at information set wˆi.
Next, we aim to specify the first-order conditions for the equilibrium prices set by the non-
integrated manufacturers. The profit function of such a manufacturer k is given by
πk(w, p) =
(
pk −
2∑
i=1
wikS
i
k(wk)
)
Dk(p) .
Non-integrated manufacturers have only one source of revenue, the downstream market. Ac-
cording to our assumptions on the manufacturers’ knowledge, these manufacturers observe at
each of their information sets only the prices of their inputs, but not the input prices the
suppliers arranged with the other downstream firms. As argued above, a non-integrated man-
ufacturer k conjectures at its information set wˆk that each non-integrated competitor m pays
the equilibrium input prices wˆm. Consequently, manufacturer k expects at this information set
that any of its competitors m sets the equilibrium output price pˆm = pˆm(wˆ). Sequential ratio-
nality at information set wˆk implies that the equilibrium price pˆk charged by the non-integrated
manufacturer k satisfies the first-order condition
∂πk
∂pk
(wˆ, pˆ) =
(
pˆk −
2∑
i=1
wˆikS
i
k(wˆk)
)
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ) +Dk(pˆ) = 0 . (6)
As can be easily checked, condition (6) is equivalent to(
pˆk −
∑2
i=1 wˆ
i
kS
i
k(wˆk)
)
pˆk
=
1
ǫk
, (7)
where ǫk := −
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ) pˆk
Dk(pˆ)
denotes the (own) price elasticity of the demand for the output
produced by non-integrated manufacturer k at the equilibrium output prices pˆ. Equation (7)
is the well-known markup rule. It states that the profit margin of manufacturer k corresponds
to the inverted value of the price elasticity of the demand for the output supplied by this
manufacturer.
Having specified all first order conditions in the downstream market, we are able to solve the
second step of our pre-merger equilibrium. For this purpose, consider a vertically integrated
firm i which delivers inputs to the non-integrated manufacturer k, i.e. Sik(wˆ) 6= 0 holds.
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Plugging the equilibrium price strategy profile pˆ(·) in the profit functions πi of this vertically
integrated firm, we obtain the indirect profit function πˆi(w) := πi(w, pˆ(w)). The optimality
conditions on the input prices charged by the vertically integrated firm i are derived from
this function. Maximizing its indirect profit function implies that firm i takes into account
the impact of its input prices on the output prices. The envelope theorem entails that the
first-order condition with respect to the input prices wik charged by the vertically integrated
firm i to the non-integrated downstream firm k is given by
∂πˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) = (pˆi − ci)
∂Di
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ) + Sik(wˆk)Dk(pˆ) + (wˆ
i
k − c
i
k)
∂Sik
∂wik
(wˆk)Dk(pˆ)
+
M∑
m=3
(wˆim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wˆm)
∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ) = 0 .
(8)
Summing up, the input and output prices (wˆ, pˆ) realized in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of our two-stage game have to satisfy the optimality conditions (5) to (8). These pre-merger
equilibrium prices constitute the reference point of the merger analysis we conduct in the
next section. To evaluate the anti-competitive effects of a merger between the two vertically
integrated firms, the upward pricing pressure induced by the merger is measured from these
prices.
4 The Situation Post-Merger
Suppose, the two vertically integrated firms merge into a new firm z. This firm comprises
four divisions, two upstream divisions producing inputs 1 and 2 and two downstream divisions
producing outputs 1 and 2. Whenever the merger does not induce cost synergies, the profit
function of the new firm z is equal to
π0z(w, p) := π1(w, p) + π2(w, p)
= (p1 − c1)D1(p) +
M∑
m=3
(w1m − c
1
m)S
1
m(wm)Dm(p)
+ (p2 − c2)D2(p) +
M∑
m=3
(w2m − c
2
m)S
2
m(wm)Dm(p).
Superscript 0 of the above profit function points to the assumption that this merger does not
generate any efficiency gains in forms of cost reductions.
The current market environment which the merged firm is confronted with is the pre-merger
equilibrium. As detailed in the previous section, this environment includes the following state
of affairs. The current input and output prices are at the pre-merger equilibrium levels wˆ and
pˆ satisfying the optimality conditions (5) to (8). Moreover, the information management of
the merged firm has not yet been changed and corresponds to that before the merger. This
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entails that the downstream division of a merging partner is still uninformed about the input
prices set by the upstream division of the other merging partner.
Our objective is to provide meaningful indices measuring the intensity of the incentive the
merged firm has to increase its input and output prices at the pre-merger equilibrium (wˆ, pˆ).
The fundamental principle underlying such upward pricing pressure indices has been put for-
ward by Werden (1996). His concept specifies the magnitude of the reduction in the marginal
costs needed for offsetting the incentive of the merged firm to increase its prices. As suggested
by Werden (1996), these hypothetical gains in cost efficiency should be taken as the measure
for the intensity of this incentive. Upward pricing pressure indices thus display the size of
the gains in cost efficiency required for the post-merger prices to remain at their pre-merger
levels. The greater the value of the upward pricing pressure indices, the greater the reduction
in marginal costs needed to keep the merged firm from increasing its prices and thus the more
likely the merger turns out to be anti-competitive.
However, unlike the original construction approach of Werden (1996), our upward pricing
pressure indices are derived from isolated price changes. This approach has been forcefully put
forward by Farell/Shapiro (2010a). They suggest to evaluate the intensity of the incentive to
increase the prices separately for each price set by the merged firm.14 The intensity with which
a division of the merged firm aims at increasing the price of its product is then measured by the
efficiency gains of this division required to keep the product price unchanged after the merger.
In doing so, the prices of any divisions and non-integrated firms which are not informed about a
change in this price are held fixed. In particular, the prices of the divisions and non-integrated
firms operating at the same or upper stage of the supply chain are kept at the pre-merger level.
With this in mind, it becomes apparent that the calculations of the upward pricing pressure
indices are not comparative statics exercises that contrast the equilibrium pre-merger with the
one post-merger. Rather, starting from the pre-merger equilibrium, these indices evaluate the
intensity with which the merged firm aims at increasing its prices by specifying the gains in
cost efficiency needed for compensating such an incentive.
Obviously, this intensity depends on the extent to which such price increases affect the profit
of the merged firm. The size of theses effects in turn depend on how the downstream divisions
of the merged firm as well as its competitors react to the increase in price. If the merged
firm increases one of its output prices, all other prices remain unchanged as this change is not
observed by the other manufacturers. If the merged firm increases one of its input prices, all
other prices remain unchanged except for two output prices. One of them is the price charged
by the downstream division of the merging partner who increased the input price. The other
price affected by this increase in the input price is the price charged by the non-integrated
manufacturer who employs this input. Notice that the remaining manufacturers do not react
14A comprehensive and gentle introduction on the various construction approaches for upward pricing pressure
indices is provided in Baltzopoulos et al. (2015). The authors particularly discuss the difference between the
two-sided efficiency approach of Werden (1996) and the one-sided efficiency approach of Farell/Shapiro (2010a).
As mentioned above, the construction of our upward pricing pressure indices follows the latter approach.
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to the change in the input price as they do not observe this change in price and thus base their
beliefs on the same information as in the situation pre-merger.
In the subsequent paragraphs we derive the upward pricing pressure indices for each of the
prices set by the merged firm. In total, the merged firm might fix 2(M−1) prices, the 2(M−2)
input prices set by its upstream divisions and the two output prices set by its downstream
divisions. In line with the standard terminology, we term our indices the gross upward pricing
pressure indices regarding a merger of two vertically integrated firms. We use henceforth the
abbreviation iGUPPI for these indices. Our analysis begins with the construction of the gross
upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPId for the two output prices. After that, we derive the
gross upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPIu for the 2(M − 2) input prices.
Following the methodology proposed by Farell/Shapiro (2010a) the upward pricing pressure
index iGUPPIi
d
gives the reduction in the marginal costs of the downstream division i needed
to offset the incentive of this division to increase output price pi. To derive this index, we thus
assume that the merger of the two vertically integrated firms generates gains in cost efficiency
for downstream division i in the amount of γi. In this case, the profit function of the merged
firm takes the form
πiz(w, p) := (pi − ci + γi)Di(p) +
M∑
m=3
(wim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wm)Dm(p)
+ (pj − cj)Dj(p) +
M∑
m=3
(wjm − c
j
m)S
j
m(wm)Dm(p).
where j denotes the other merging partner. Superscript i of the above profit function relates
to our assumption that the merger generates only gains in cost efficiency for the downstream
division of merging partner i.
Taking into account the first-order condition (5), the change in the profit of the merged firm
at the pre-merger equilibrium prices (wˆ, pˆ) induced by an increase in its output price pi corre-
sponds to
∂πiz
∂pi
(wˆ, pˆ) = γi
∂Di
∂pi
(pˆ) + (pˆj − cj)
∂Dj
∂pi
(pˆ) +
M∑
m=3
(wˆjm − c
j
m)S
j
m(wˆ)
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ).
Analogous to Farell/Salop (2010a), we aim to figure out the magnitude of the reduction in the
marginal costs of downstream division i preventing the merged firm from increasing output
price pi. Putting it differently, we have to specify the size of the cost efficiency parameter γi for
which the above equation vanishes, i.e.
∂πiz
∂pi
(wˆ, pˆ) = 0 holds. We denote henceforth this critical
value by γˆi. Solving the last equation for γˆi and then dividing both sides by the pre-merger
output price pˆi we obtain
γˆi
pˆi
=
(pˆj − cj)
∂Dj
∂pi
(pˆ) +
∑M
m=3(wˆ
j
m − c
j
m)S
j
m(wˆ)
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ)
−pˆi
∂Di
∂pi
(pˆ)
. (9)
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The expression on left-hand side of equation (9) states the required gains in cost efficiency for
downstream division i in percentage of the pre-merger equilibrium price of i’s product. The
ratio on the right-hand side defines our gross upward pricing pressure index for output price
pi, shortly iGUPPI
i
d
. It relates the additional profits accruing to merging partner j to the value
of the lost sales of downstream division i due to an increase in price pi.
We remark that the term of the numerator of our iGUPPIi
d
decomposes the total effect of an
increase in price pi into two effects. The first summand of the numerator describes the effect on
the demand for the product offered by merging partner j. Since the product of the downstream
division j is a substitute to the product offered by downstream division i the demand for j’s
product increases as the price of i’s product goes up. The second summand is the effect on
the demand for the input offered by merging partner j. Due to the increase in the price of
output i there is additional demand for the outputs of the non-integrated manufacturers. The
increase in their production leads in turn to an increased demand for the inputs offered by the
upstream division of the merging partner j.
Our assumptions on the demand functions and the no cross subsidization assumption (1) entail
that the two effects described in the numerator of iGUPPIi
d
are positive so that merging partner
j unambiguously profits from the merger. Moreover, the denominator which measures the value
of the lost sales of merging partner i is also positive. Consequently, our index iGUPPIi
d
turns
out to be positive, implying that any merger of vertical integrated firms induces an upward
pressure on the prices set by their downstream divisions.15
Next, we aim at specifying the upward pricing pressure indices for the input prices charged
by the upstream divisions of the merged firm. For this purpose, pick some supplier i which
delivers inputs to some non-integrated manufacturer k. In mathematical terms, we suppose
that Sik(wˆ) > 0 holds in the following derivation. As before, we proceed as suggested by
Farell/Shapiro (2010a). We assume that the merger generates a reduction in the marginal
costs of i’s production for manufacturer k in the amount of γik. Given such gains in cost
efficiency, the profit function of the merged firm takes the form
πkz (w, p) := (pi − ci)Di(p) + (w
i
k − c
i
k + γ
i
k)S
i
k(wk)Dk(p)
+
M∑
m=3,m 6=k
(wim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wm)Dm(p)
+ (pj − cj)Dj(p) +
M∑
m=3
(wjm − c
j
m)S
j
m(wm)Dm(p)
15One might substantiate this result by arguing that the merging firms are already vertically integrated and
thus there is downward pricing pressure due to the avoidance of double marginalization. However, this argument
holds only for the downstream divisions of the merged firm. Regarding the upstream divisions, such pricing
pressure might occur. To see this, consider a downstream non-integrated manufacturer who utilizes the inputs
of the two upstream divisions of the merged firm in a fixed ratio (i.e. in a complementary way). In such a case
the merger might overcome the pre-merger problem of double marginalization with which the two competing
suppliers and the non-integrated manufacturer are faced. We come back to this effect in Section 5 when we are
applying our price indices to a merger example.
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where j denotes the other merging partner. Superscript k of the above profit function points
to our assumption that the merger brings about only efficiency gains regarding the production
of supplier i for manufacturer k.
To capture the effect of an increase in input price wik on the profit of the merged firm, we resort
to the pre-merger equilibrium price strategies specified in the previous section. Plugging these
price strategies into the profit function of the merged firm gives the indirect profit function
πˆkz (w) := π
k
z (w, pˆ(w)) .
Partially differentiating this function with respect to input price wik at the pre-merger equi-
librium (wˆ, pˆ), we obtain the initial effect of an increase in input price wik on the profit of the
merged firm. Taking into account the first-order condition (8) and pˆ = pˆ(wˆ), the derivative is
given by
∂πˆkz
∂wik
(wˆ) = γik
∂Sik
∂wik
(wˆ)Dk(pˆ) + γ
i
kS
i
k(wˆ)
(
∂Dk
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
+ (pj − cj)
(
∂Dj
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dj
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
+ (wˆjk − c
j
k)
∂Sjk
∂wik
(wˆk)Dk(pˆ)
+ (wˆjk − c
j
k)S
j
k(wˆk)
(
∂Dk
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
+
M∑
m=3,m 6=k
(wˆjm − c
j
m)S
j
m(wˆm)
(
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
.
We aim to find out the magnitude of the efficiency gain γik needed for compensating the incen-
tive of the upstream division i to increase its input price for manufacturer k. In mathematical
terms, we have to specify the size of the efficiency gain γik implying
∂πˆkz
∂wi
k
(wˆ) = 0. The required
efficiency gain is henceforth denoted by γˆik. Solving the last equation for γˆ
i
k and then dividing
both sides by the pre-merger input price wˆik yields
γˆik
wˆik
=
[
(pˆj − cj)
(
∂Dj
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dj
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
+ (wˆjk − c
j
k)
∂Sjk
∂wik
(wˆk)Dk(pˆ)
+ (wˆjk − c
j
k)S
j
k(wˆk)
(
∂Dk
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)
+
M∑
m=3,m 6=k
(wˆjm − c
j
m)S
j
m(wˆm)
(
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)]
[
−wˆik
∂Sik
∂wik
(wˆk)Dk(pˆ)− wˆ
i
kS
i
k(wˆk)
(
∂Dk
∂pi
(pˆ)
∂pˆi
∂wik
(wˆ) +
∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ)
∂pˆk
∂wik
(wˆ)
)]−1
.
(10)
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The expression on the left-hand side of Equation (10) states that the required gains in cost
efficiency in percentage of the pre-merger equilibrium input price paid by manufacturer k to
upstream division i. The term on the right-hand side defines our gross upward pricing pressure
index for input price wik, abbreviated henceforth with iGUPPI
u
k. This ratio relates the additional
profits earned by merging partner j to the value of the lost sales of merging partner i due to
an increase in price wik.
The numerator of the term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) decomposes the total impact
of the increase in input price wik on the profit of the merging partner j into three effects:
(i) the effect on the profit earned by the downstream division of merging partner j,
(ii) the effect on the profit earned by the upstream division of merging partner j from the
business relationship with the non-integrated manufacturer k,
(iii) the effect on the profit earned by the upstream division of merging partner j from the
business relationship with the non-integrated manufacturers different to k.
Effect (i) is captured by the first summand of the numerator. As discussed above, an increase
in input price wik affects the prices of the products supplied by the downstream division of
merging partner i and by the non-integrated manufacturer k. Since both products are imperfect
substitutes to the product offered by the downstream division of merging partner j, the demand
for this product might change. Indeed, our assumptions (2) and (4) imply that the increase in
input price wik induces an increase in the demand for product j. The latter influences positively
the profit of the downstream division of merging partner j.
Effect (ii) is summarized by the second and third summand of the numerator. This effect can
in turn be decomposed into two effects, an input substitution effect and an output substitution
effect. The input substitution effect is described by the second summand. Notice that due
to the increase in input price wik the non-integrated manufacturer k is prompted to revise its
production process. It might partly substitute inputs from other suppliers for the input offered
by the upstream division of merging partner i. In particular, the non-integrated manufacturer
k might partially replace this input with the input offered by the upstream division of the other
merging partner j. Consequently, a positive effect on the profit of this division might result
from this substitution of inputs.
The substitution effect in the downstream market unleashed by an increase in input price wik
is captured by the third summand of the numerator. It refers to the impact such a price
increase has on the demand for the product offered by the non-integrated manufacturer k. As
noted above, an increase in input price wik affects the prices of the products supplied by the
downstream division of merging partner i and by the non-integrated manufacturer k. The
demand for manufacturer k’s product is therefore subjected to both an own price effect and a
cross price effect. Our assumptions (2) and (3) imply that the own price effect is stronger than
the cross price effect so that the demand for manufacturer k’s product falls. This, in turn,
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causes a drop in the demand of manufacturer k for the input supplied by the upstream division
of merging partner j. Hence, the substitution of outputs triggered by an increase in input price
wik might negatively affect the profit of this division. Summing up, the output substitution
effect counteracts the input substitution effect we described in the previous paragraph. For
this reason, the sign of effect (ii) is not determinable a priori.
Effect (iii) is captured by the fourth summand of the numerator. As we already know, an
increase in input price wik affects the prices of the products supplied by the downstream division
of merging partner i and by the non-integrated manufacturer k. Theses products are assumed
to be imperfect substitutes to the products offered by the non-integrated manufacturersm 6= k.
Hence, the demand for the product of such a manufacturer is affected by an increase in input
price wik. More precisely, our premises (2) and (4) entail that this demand goes up due to
an increase in input price wik. This rise in the demand for manufacturer m’s product, in
turn, might trigger an increase in manufacturer m’s demand for the input supplied by the
upstream division of merging partner j. In consequence, the profit earned by this upstream
division from its business relationship with the non-integrated manufacturers m 6= k might be
positively influenced by an increase in input price wit.
The denominator of the term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) summarizes the total
impact of the increase in price wik on the sales of the upstream division of merging partner i to
the non-integrated manufacturer k. As displayed by the two summands of the denominator,
this impact can be decomposed into two effects, an input substitution effect and an output sub-
stitution effect. The first effect is captured by the first summand and operates in the following
manner. The non-integrated manufacturer k might respond to an increase in input price wik by
adjusting its production process. In particular, it might partially substitute other inputs for the
input offered by the upstream division of merging partner i. Such an input substitution entails
that a lower quantity of inputs supplied by this upstream division is employed by manufacturer
k per unit of output. As a consequence thereof, the substitution effect might reduce the sales
of the upstream division of merging partner i to manufacturer k. The second effect on these
sales is captured by the second summand. It describes the substitution effect on the output of
manufacturer k due to the increase in input price wik. Recall that an increase in input price
wik alters the prices of the products offered by the downstream division of merging partner
i and the non-integrated manufacturer k. The demand for manufacturer k’s product is thus
affected by a change in its own price and a change in the price of one of its substitutes. Due
our premises (2) and (3) the resulting change in the demand for manufacturer k’s product is
negative. This, in turn, affects negatively the demand of manufacturer k for the input supplied
by the upstream division of merging partner i. Thus, the input substitution effect and the
output substitution effect go into the same direction. For this reason, it is unambiguous that
the sales of the upstream division of merging partner i to the non-integrated manufacturer k
decreases due to an increase in input price wik.
The sign of the pricing pressure indices iGUPPIu turns out to be indeterminate given the
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assumptions we have imposed on our two-stage competition game, implying that it is not a
priori established that the merged firm has an incentive to increase its input prices. This
ambiguity results from the output substitution contained in effect (ii). Because an increase of
input price wik leads to an decrease in the demand for product k, the output substitution effect
turns out to be negative whenever manufacturer k sources inputs from supplier j. The output
substitution effect counteracts all other effects on the profit of merging partner j, i.e. the input
substitution effect contained in effect (ii) and the two effects (i) and (iii). Interestingly, this
ambiguity remains even if one additionally assumes that the impact of an increase in input
price wik on the output price pi is negligible and the non-integrated manufacturer k operates
with a fixed input ratio.16 However, in the case that the upstream division of merging partner
j delivers no inputs to manufacturer k, our pricing pressure indices iGUPPIu become definitely
positive.
5 iGUPPIs for Input and Output Prices
Our upward pricing pressure indices we have derived in the previous section are aimed to score
a merger between two vertically integrated firms. More precisely, they are designed to evaluate
the incentives of such a merged firm to raise its prices. Our indices turn out to be in line with
the evaluation principles outlined in the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. We quote the
explanation made on page 21 of this guideline.
Adverse unilateral price effects can arise when the merger gives the merged entity
an incentive to raise the price of a product previously sold by one merging firm and
thereby divert sales to products previously sold by the other merging firm, boosting
the profits on the latter products. Taking as given other prices and product offerings,
that boost to profits is equal to the value to the merged firm of the sales diverted to
those products. [...]
Moreover, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines are very detailed on how the upward pricing
pressure induced by a merger should be measured. They postulate in footnote 11:
For this purpose, the value of diverted sales is measured in proportion to the lost
revenues attributable to the reduction in unit sales resulting from the price increase.
Those lost revenues equal the reduction in the number of units sold of that product
multiplied by that product’s price.
As required by this directive, each of our upward pricing pressure indices is like the standard
GUPPI and vGUPPI concepts a ratio between two monetary amounts. Its numerator gives the
additional profit a merging partner realizes if the other merging partner increases one of its
prices. This additional profit which is known as the recapture of the merger is attributable
16We come back to this indeterminancy issue in the next section where we provide a numerical example for
our price indices.
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to the increase in sales of the merging partner’s upstream and downstream division. The
denominator of our indices captures the lost revenues of the merging partner who has increased
one of its prices. This loss is attributable to the reduction of sales its downstream or upstream
division undergo due to this price increase.
In what follows, we reformulate our upward pricing pressure indices in a way so that they can
be calculated from observable market data. More precisely, by suitable transformations we
trace back our indices to the following economic variables:
• diversion ratios DRkm,
• profit margins Mk and M
i
k,
• cost-pass-through elasticities ηik,
• input coefficient elasticities σik,
• price transmission ratios δik.
These variables are detailed in the subsequent paragraphs.
Obviously, if manufacturer k increases the price of its product, some of its customers might
switch to other products. In particular, some former customers of manufacturer k become
customers of manufacturer m 6= k. The diversion ratio DRkm := −
∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ)/∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ) from
manufacturer k to manufacturer m gives the share of k’s lost sales which are captured by
m due to an increase in the price of the product supplied by k. This ratio is calculated at
the pre-merger equilibrium output prices pˆ. Obviously, the diversion ratio can be specified
by DRkm =
ǫkm
ǫk
Dm(pˆ)
Dk(pˆ)
where where ǫkm := −
∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ) pk
Dm(pˆ)
is the cross price elasticity of
demand for product m with respect to the price of product k 6= m evaluated at the pre-merger
equilibrium output prices pˆ. Diversion ratios have been introduced by Shapiro (1996) and
Werden (1996) in merger analysis and have become one of the key concepts of the upward
pricing pressure approach.
The profit margin Mk denotes the profit manufacturer k earns per sold unit in percentage of
the pre-merger equilibrium price pˆk. Obviously, the profit margin of the downstream division
of a vertically integrated firm i is given by Mi := (pˆi− ci)/pˆi while the one of a non-integrated
manufacturer k is given by Mk := (pˆk −
∑2
i=1 wˆ
i
kS
i
k(wˆk))/pˆk. Recall that the markup rule
(7) establishes the relationship Mk = 1/ǫk for any non-integrated manufacturer k. The profit
margin M ik := (wˆ
i
k − c
i
k)/wˆ
i
k denotes the profit the downstream division of the vertically
integrated firm i earns per unit of input sold to manufacturer k in percentage of the pre-
merger equilibrium input price wˆik.
An increase in the price wik of the input sold to manufacturer k might be partially passed on
to manufactures k’s customers by means of a higher output price. The relative size of this
effect is measured by ηik :=
∂pˆk
∂wi
k
(wˆ)
wˆik
pˆk
, the cost-pass-through elasticity of the price of the
product offered by manufacturer k with respect to the price of the input offered by supplier i
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to manufacturer k. This elasticity is calculated at the pre-merger equilibrium input prices wˆ
and indicates approximately the percentage change in the price of manufacturer k’s product
due to an increase in input price wˆik by one percent
A change in input price wik might not only affect the output price of manufacturer k, but also
its production process. Whenever the input offered by supplier i becomes more expensive,
the manufacturer might modify its employed input combination, partially substituting other
inputs for the input of supplier i. The relative change in the contribution of supplier j’s
input for manufacturer k’s production is measured by the input coefficient elasticity σijk :=
−
∂S
j
k
∂wi
k
(wˆk)
wˆik
S
j
k
(wˆk)
, i.e., the elasticity of input j’s coefficient of manufacturer k’s production with
respect to the price manufacturer k pays for input i. This elasticity is evaluated at the pre-
merger equilibrium prices wˆ and indicates approximately the percentage change in input j’s
coefficient of k’s production due to an increase in input price wˆik by one percent. To simplify
our notation, we denote henceforth the own price input coefficient elasticity by σik instead of
σiik .
As already discussed in Section 4, an increase in input price wik influences the demand for
the product offered by manufacturer m through two price transmission channels in our two-
stage competition model. Recall that manufacturer k and the downstream division of merging
partner i are the only firms who observe this price change. For this reason, only they can
respond by adjusting their output prices. The price adjustment of manufacturer k has been
referred to as the direct price channel and the price adjustment of the downstream division of
merging partner i has been referred to as the indirect price channel. The relative significance
of these price channels on the demand for manufacturer m’s product is indicated by the ratio
δikm :=
∂Dm
∂pi
(pˆ) ∂pˆi
∂wi
k
(wˆ)/∂Dm
∂pk
(pˆ) ∂pk
∂wi
k
(wˆ). This ratio is henceforth termed the price transmission
ratio of the demand for product m with respect to an increase in input price wik at the pre-
merger equilibrium price vector (wˆ, pˆ). Its numerator captures the change in the demand for
product m caused through the indirect price channel, i.e., due to the change of output price pi
induced by an increase of input price wik. Its denominator captures the change in the demand
for product m caused through the direct price channel, i.e., due to the change of price pk
induced again by the increase of wik. Our assumptions (2) to (4) guarantee that δ
i
km < −1
is satisfied. By suitable transformation the price transmission ratio can be expressed as the
product of a ratio of (cross) price elasticities and a ratio of (cross) cost pass-through elasticities.
As can be easily checked, the relationship δikm =
ǫim
ǫkm
ηiki
ηi
k
holds where ηikm :=
∂pˆm
∂wi
k
(wˆ)
wik
pˆm
is the
cross cost-pass-through elasticity of the price of the product offered by the manufacturer m
with respect to the price of the input offered by supplier i to manufacturer k 6= m evaluated at
the pre-merger equilibrium input prices wˆ. For the sake of simplification, we denote henceforth
the price transmission ratio of the demand for product k with respect to input price wik by δ
i
k
instead of δikk.
In the following paragraphs, we reconsider our upward pricing pressure indices and transform
them in a way so that they can be expressed by the economic variables described above.
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Moreover, to illustrate the usefulness of this transformation we apply the derived formulas to
a contrived merger example.
First, reconsider the upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPId for the output prices charged
by the merged firm. These indices have already been described by the term on the right-
hand side of Equation (9). Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of this term by
−(∂Di/∂pi)(pˆ), we obtain the formula
iGUPPIi
d
:=
DRij pˆjMj +
∑M
m=3DRimS
j
mwˆ
j
mM
j
m
pˆi
(11)
where j denotes the merging partner of firm i and Sjm := S
j
m(wˆm) denotes the manufacturerm’s
production coefficient regarding the input offered by supplier j at the pre-merger equilibrium
input prices wˆm.
Notice that due the above transformation the interpretation of our indices iGUPPId turn out
to be slightly different than that given in Section 4. Being more precise, the reference point of
our interpretation is rescaled by this transformation. Recall that index iGUPPIi
d
in the form of
Equation (9) gives the additional profits and the value of the lost sales due to an increase of
the output price pi by one monetary unit. In contrast, the form presented in Definition (11)
measures the additional profits and the value of the lost sales due to an increase of the output
price pi inducing a loss of sales for downstream division i by one physical unit.
Interestingly, our upward pricing pressure index for output price pi proves to be the sum of
two well-known upward pricing pressure indices. The ratio (DRij pˆjMj)/pˆi is nothing different
than the gross upward pricing pressure index for horizontal mergers GUPPIi as derived by
Salop/Moresi (2009). This ratio summarizes the upward pricing pressure resulting from the
merger of the downstream divisions of 1 and 2. The ratio (
∑M
m=3DRimS
j
mwˆ
j
mM
j
m)/pˆi is the
gross upward pricing pressure index for vertical mergers vGUPPIi
d
with respect to the output
price pi as suggested by Moresi/Salop (2013) in their Equation (A14).
17 It summarizes the
upward pressure resulting from the merger between the downstream division of i and the
upstream division of j on this price. We conclude from the composition of our iGUPPId that
if the GUPPI concept of Salop/Moresi (2009) or the vGUPPId concept of Moresi/Salop (2013) is
mistakenly applied to evaluating the merger between two vertically integrated firms then the
upward pressure on the output prices is underestimated.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our upward pricing pressure indices they are applied to a
contrived merger example. Consider a supply chain with two markets, an upstream market
and a downstream market. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the production of one
output unit requires exactly one unit of input. In the pre-merger situation, there are two
independent vertically integrated firms 1 and 2 being active in both markets (i.e. no input
foreclosure). Their upstream divisions u1 and u2 are the only suppliers of the input. Besides
17Indeed, this index has been termed vGUPPId1 by Moresi/Salop (2013). To be in line with our notation, we
denote the index by vGUPPId.
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their downstream divisions d1 and d2 there are three non-integrated manufacturers in the
downstream market, 3, 4, and 5. Manufacturer 3 sources all inputs from supplier u1 whereas
manufacturer 5 sources all inputs from supplier u2. Only manufacturer 4 employs inputs from
both suppliers. Twenty percent of its inputs stem from upstream division u1 and the remaining
eighty percent stem from upstream division u2. The supply relationships in the pre-merger
market situation are depicted in the below figure.
3
1
u1
d1 4
2
u2
d2 5
Consumers
1 11 0.2 0.8 1
Figure 1: Situation pre-merger
According to the above assumptions on the supply relationships, the input coefficients of man-
ufacturer 3 are equal to S13 := 1 and S
2
3 := 0, that of manufacturer 4 are equal to S
1
4 := 0.2
and S24 := 0.8, and that of manufacturer 5 are equal to S
1
5 := 0 and S
2
5 := 1. Moreover, we
assume that the upstream division of each vertically integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} charges currently
a price wˆim := 0.5 per unit of input to any non-integrated manufacturer m ∈ {3, 4, 5}. The
downstream division of each vertically integrated firm i ∈ {1, 2} charges a price pˆi := 1 per
unit of output to its customers. The profit margins of the downstream divisions and upstream
divisions amount to 50 percent, i.e.,Mi := 0.5 andM
i
m := 0.5 hold for any vertically integrated
firm i ∈ {1, 2} and for any non-integrated manufacturer m ∈ {3, 4, 5}. We also assume that
whenever one of the downstream divisions of the vertically integrated firms increases the price
of its product, any other manufacturer captures 20 percent of the customers this division loses
due to the price increase. Putting it differently, the diversion ratio between the product offered
by downstream division i and the product offered by some manufacturer m ∈ {1, . . . , 5} where
m 6= i is assumed to be equal to DRim := 0.2.
Now, suppose that the two vertically integrated firms intend to merge. By means of our
upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPId we are able to evaluate the intensity of the incentive
such a merged firm has to increase the prices of its outputs. Before calculating this upward
pricing pressure, we illustrate the effects summarized by these indices in Figure 2. This figure
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highlights the forces behind the upward pressure on the product price p1 charged by the
downstream division of merging partner 1. An increase in this price leads to a decrease in
the demand for the product of this division. However, as we already know, these losses are
partially recaptured by the merging partner 2. The losses of the merging partner 1 and the
gains of the merging partner 2 due to an increase in price p1 are depicted by the grey lines in
the below figure.
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Figure 2: Sources of pressure on output price p1 post-meger
As argued in Section 4, an increase in this price generates additional profits to merging partner
2 in two ways. The first one relates to the profit of its upstream division. Due to the increase
in price p1 the demand for the product offered by the upstream division of merging partner 2
goes up and thus additional profits are earned by this division. This effect is marked in the
below figure by the lower-case letter h. It is the so-called horizontal upward pricing pressure of
the merger. The second way relates to the profit of the downstream division of merging partner
2. Due to the increase in price p1 the demand for the products offered by the non-integrated
competitors also goes up. In consequence, these competitors sell more units of output and
thus sources more inputs from their suppliers. In particular, some of these competitors might
demand more inputs from the upstream division of merging partner 2. Hence, this upstream
division earns a higher profit due to the increase in price p1. This effect is marked by the
lower-case letter v in Figure 2. It is the so-called vertical upward pricing pressure of the
merger.
We apply our iGUPPId formula to quantify the upward pricing pressure on the prices of the
outputs 1 and 2 due to a merger of the vertically integrated firms 1 and 2. Inserting the
numerical values stipulated above in Definition (11), we obtain a gross upward pressure on the
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price of output 1 in the amount of
iGUPPI1
d
=
0.2× 1× 0.5 + 0.2× 0.8× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5
1
= 0.19 .
This index number states that a unilateral increase in price for output 1 does not occur post-
merger if the merger were to reduce the marginal cost of producing output 1 by 19 percentage
of the pre-merger price for output 1. Because the price for this output has been set equal to 1 in
our numerical example, this index reveals that the marginal cost of producing output 1 has to
decrease by 0.19 monetary units in order to offset the incentive of the merged firm to increase
the price of output 1. Notice that the assumed profit margin of downstream division d1 discloses
that that pre-merger marginal cost of producing output 1 is equal to 0.5. Consequentially, only
if the merger entails efficiency gains reducing at least this marginal cost by 38 percent, the
merged firm abstains from increasing the price of output 1.
The gross upward price pressure on the price for output 2 is equal to
iGUPPI2
d
=
0.2× 1× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 0.2× 0.5× 0.5
1
= 0.16 .
Obviously, the incentive of the merged firm to increase the price of output 2 is weaker than
the one to increase the price of output 1. The reason for this is that the recapture of merging
partner 1 due to an increase in output price p2 is less than the recapture of merging partner 2
due to an increase in output price p1. This difference can be finally traced back to the input
combination employed by the non-integrated manufacturer 4. All other economic conditions are
symmetric for the two merging partner. Whenever one of the output prices p1 and p2 increases,
manufacturer 4 faces a greater demand for its product. However, because this manufacturer
sources fewer inputs from upstream division u1 than from upstream division u2, the latter
division profits more from this increase in demand.
Let us briefly come back to the fundamental issue on how to calculate the upward pricing
pressure on an output price in case of a merger of two vertically integrated firms. Suppose
merger analysts mistakenly take the standard GUPPI concept of Salop/Moresi (2009) or the
vGUPPI concept of Moresi/Salop (2013) as the measure of the upward pricing pressure. In the
first case, they would calculate an upward pricing pressure on output price p1 in amount of
GUPPI1 = 0.1. In the second case, they come up with an upward pricing pressure for this price
of vGUPPI1
d
= 0.09. Both values underestimate the true incentive of the merged firm by about
50 percent. We infer from this simple numerical example that applying the appropriate index
formula is crucial for evaluating correctly the upward pricing pressure induced by a merger.
Our next task is to reformulate also the upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPIu for the
input prices charged by the merged firm so that they are expressed by the economic vari-
ables presented at the beginning of this section. These indices have already been specified
on the right-hand side of Equation (10). Dividing both the numerator and the denominator
by −∂Dk
∂pk
(pˆ) ∂pk
∂wi
k
(wˆ) and applying the mark-up rule (7), our gross upward price pressure index
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iGUPPIui,k with respect to input price w
i
k takes the form of
iGUPPIui,k :=
(1 + δikj)DRkj pˆjMj −
(
1 + δik +
Mkσ
ij
k
ηi
k
)
Sjkwˆ
j
kM
j
k +
∑M
m=3
m 6=k
(1 + δikm)DRkmS
j
mwˆ
j
mM
j
m(
1 + δik +
M
k
σi
k
ηi
k
)
Sikwˆ
i
k
.
(12)
where j denotes the merging partner of i and Sim := S
m := Sim(wˆm) denotes the manufacturer
m’s production coefficient with respect to the input offered by supplier i at the pre-merger
equilibrium input prices wˆm.
We note that by the above transformation the interpretation of the numerator and the denom-
inator of iGUPPIui,k is modified. Recall that in the form of Definition (10) the numerator gives
the additional profits of merging partner j and the denominator gives the value of the lost sales
of merging partner i due to an increase in input price wik by one monetary unit. The above
transformation rescales the reference point of this interpretation. More precisely, in Definition
(12) the numerator captures the additional profits of merging partner j and the denominator
captures the value of the lost sales due to an increase in input price wik so that the direct price
channel induces a decrease of the demand for product k by one physical unit.
Apart from the different reference points, the effects summarized in the numerator and denom-
inator of the term in Definition 12) are the same as described in Section 4. The first summand
of the numerator is effect (i) and captures the effect of the input price increase on the profit
earned by the downstream division of merging partner j. The second summand corresponds
to effect (ii) and captures the effect on the profit earned by the upstream division of merg-
ing partner j from its business relationship with non-integrated manufacturer k. As noted in
Section 4, this effect can further be decomposed into two effects. The factor (1 + δik) relates
to the so-called output substitution effect. It results from the lower output of manufacturer
k because of its higher production costs. The factor (Mkσ
ij
k )/η
i
k relates to the so-called input
substitution effect. It results from the substitution of input j for input i since the latter input
has become more expensive. The rightmost summand of the numerator describes effect (iii)
and captures the effect on the profit earned by the upstream division of merging partner j
from its business relationship with the non-integrated manufacturers different to k. The above
index formula is quite complex. In the following we impose additional assumption regarding
the price reactions of the manufacturers and the substitutability of the inputs so that this
formula can interpreted more easily.
If we assume that the downstream division of merging partner i does not react to the price
change induced by its upstream division (i.e. ∂pˆi
∂wi
k
(wˆ) = 0 and thus δik,m = 0 for any indepen-
dent manufacturer m), then our index iGUPPIui,k for input price w
i
k reduces to
iGUPPI1ui,k :=
DRkj pˆjMj −
(
1 +
Mkσ
ij
k
ηi
k
)
Sjkwˆ
j
kM
j
k +
∑M
m=3,m 6=kDRkmS
j
mwˆ
j
mM
j
m(
1 +
M
k
σi
k
ηi
k
)
Sikwˆ
i
k
. (13)
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By the latter assumption, the demand for the product offered by manufacturer k is affected
only by the direct channel. Hence, we consider an increase in input price wik generating a
decrease in the demand for product k by one physical unit in our interpretation of Definition
(13).
Moreover, the first summand of the above formula corresponds exactly to the vGUPPIui,k formula
derived by Moresi/Salop (2013) in their Equation (5) for the case of input substitution.18. This
term captures the upward pressure resulting from the merger of the upstream division of firm
i and the downstream division of firm j on the input price wik. It is the vertical pressure
induced by a merger of two vertically integrated firms on this price. The sum of the second
and third summand turns out to be the GUPPI formula for the merger of two upstream multi-
product firms.19 This sum captures the upward pressure resulting from the merger between the
upstream divisions of firm i and firm j on input price wik. It is called the horizontal pressure
generated by a merger of two vertically integrated firms on this price.
If we additionally assume that there is no input substitution, i.e. σijk = 0 holds for any suppliers
i, j and any manufacturer k, our index iGUPPIui,k is further simplified to
iGUPPI2ui,k :=
DRkj pˆjMj − S
j
kwˆ
j
kM
j
k +
∑M
m=3,
m 6=k
DRkmS
j
mwˆ
j
mM
j
m
Sikwˆ
i
k
. (14)
Unlike the more general index iGUPPI1ui,k, the sign of the second summand in the numerator of
iGUPPI2ui,k turns out to be unambiguously negative. This sign indicates that the profit of the
upstream division of merging partner j earned with the business relationship with manufacturer
k drops whenever the upstream division of merging partner i charges a higher price for the
inputs employed by manufacturer k.
In the following, we aim to calculate the upward pressure on the input prices for the merger
example we described above. For this purpose, we assume that the assumptions underlying
our indices iGUPPI2u apply to our example. The upstream divisions of the integrated firms
thus do not react to changes in the input prices charged by their downstream divisions and
all manufacturers produce with fixed input coefficients, i.e., the manufactures cannot replace
inputs from one supplier with inputs from the other suppliers. Before specifying quantitatively
the upward pricing pressure induced by a merger between the two vertically integrated firms
1 and 2, we illustrate the different forces behind this pressure in Figure 3.
This figure shows the forces behind the upward pricing pressure on the input price w14 charged
by upstream division u1 to manufacturer 4. The lost revenues of upstream division u1 and the
changes in the profit of merging partner 2 due to an increase in input price w14 are depicted by
the grey lines. As argued in Section 4, we can identify three effects on the profit of merging
18Indeed, Moresi/Salop (2013) denote these indices by vGUPPIu.
19The derivation of this variant of the GUPPI follows the standard approach. The only difference between this
derivation and our derivation in Section 4 is that we have to take into account in the former derivation that the
two merging firms do not operate in the downstream market. Indeed, the profit function of such an upstream
firm i would be given by pii(w, p) =
∑
M
m=3
(wim − c
i
m)S
i
m(wm)Dm(p).
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Figure 3: Sources of pressure on input price w14 post-merger
partner 2 resulting from such a price increase. The first one is the effect on the profit of its
upstream division. Owing to the increase in input price w14 the marginal cost of manufacturer
4 rises. Manufacturer 4 partly pass on the increase of its marginal costs to its customers
through a higher product price. In consequence, some of its customers are prompted to switch
to other manufacturers, e.g. to the downstream division of merging partner 2. This recapture
of downstream division d2 constitutes the so-called vertical upward pressure on input price w14 .
It is marked by the lower-case letter v in Figure 3 and is definitely positive.
In addition to this effect, an increase in input price w14 impacts the profit of the upstream
division of merging partner 2. This happens in two ways. First, because one of its inputs
becomes more expensive manufacturer 4’s competitiveness is reduced. Manufacturer 4 sells
fewer products. Moreover, since it operates with a fixed input ratio the increase in input price
w14 leads to no substitution of input 2 for input 1. As a consequence, manufacturer 4 demands
fewer inputs from both upstream divisions. In particular, the profit of the upstream division u2
diminishes. The other effect relates to the input demand of manufacturer 5. The deteriorating
competitiveness of manufacturer 4 induces a boost in the demand for the product offered by
manufacturer 5. Such a boost entails that manufacturer 5 demands more inputs from upstream
division u2. This increase in demand in turn raises the profit of upstream division u2. The two
effects just described on the profit of upstream division u2 constitute the horizontal pressure
on the input price w14. It is marked by the lower-case letter h in Figure 3. Notice that the two
effects are counteracting forces so that the sign of the horizontal pricing pressure is a priori
undetermined.
To quantify the upward pressure on the input prices for our merger example we apply the
above iGUPPI2u formulas. Notice first that the pricing pressure indices cannot be calculated
for the input price w15 and w
2
3 because there is no pre-merger business relationship between
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supplier 1 and manufacturer 5 as well as between supplier 2 and manufacturer 3. Regarding
input price w13 , we obtain a gross upward pricing pressure in the amount of
iGUPPI2u1,3 =
0.2× 1× 0.5 + 0.2× 0.8× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5
0.5
= 0.38 .
This index number reveals that an unilateral increase in input price w13 would not occur post-
merger if the merger were to reduce the marginal cost of the upstream division u1 in producing
inputs for manufacturer 3 by 38 percentage of the pre-merger price of this input. Because the
latter price has been assumed to be equal to 0.5, a reduction in the marginal cost of 0.19
monetary units is thus needed to offset the upward pricing pressure induced by the recapture
of merging partner 2. Recall that the profit margin of the upstream division u1 regarding its
supply relationship with manufacturer 3 has been set equal to 0.5. We infer from this margin
that u1’s pre-merger marginal cost of producing inputs for manufacturer 3 amounts to 0.25.
Therefore, only in the case that the merger generates a reduction of this marginal cost by 76
percent, the merged firm keeps the input price w13 at its pre-merger level.
The gross upward pressure on input price w14 is equal to
iGUPPI2u1,4 =
0.2× 1× 0.5− 0.8× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5
0.2× 0.5
= −0.5 .
The negative number of this index states that even if the merger does not entail cost efficiency
gains in the manner that the upstream division u1 can produce inputs for manufacturer 4 with
lower costs, the merged firm would nevertheless decrease the price of the input for manufacturer
4. Prima facie, this result might seem strange. If we look more closely at the situations pre-
and post-merger, however, it becomes clear why this occurs. The reason is that the problem
of double marginalization prevailing pre-merger is resolved by the merger. To see this, recall
our above finding that if one of the inputs becomes more costly for manufacturer 4, this
manufacturer demands fewer inputs from both suppliers. In the situation pre-merger, each
upstream division disregards the losses accruing to the other upstream division if it raises the
price of the input offered to manufacturer 4. A consequence of this ignorance is that the two
divisions might charge overly high prices being unfavorable for both of them. However, the
negative externality just described is taken into account by the two divisions post-merger so
that they have an incentive to cut the prices of these inputs. Indeed, for the upstream division
u1, this downward pricing pressure dominates the opposite pricing pressures.
The gross upward pressure on the input price w24 is given by
iGUPPI2u2,4 =
0.2× 1× 0.5− 0.2× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5
0.8× 0.5
= 0.25 .
Unlike upstream division u1, upstream division u2 is prompted to increase the price of the
input offered to manufacturer 4 after the merger. The divergence results from the fact that
manufacturer 4’s fixed coefficients with respect to the inputs offered by the two upstream
divisions differ. Recall that its coefficient with respect to the input offered by u1 is 0.2 while
its coefficient with respect to the input offered by u2 is 0.8. This difference entails that if
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upstream division u2 raises the price of the input offered to manufacturer 4, the losses of
upstream division u1 are lower than the other way around. Since upstream division u2 hurts
the other upstream division to a relatively small extent by increasing this price, the resulting
downward pricing pressure is relatively weak and is finally outweighed by the opposite pricing
pressures.
Regarding input price w25 , we obtain an upward pricing pressure in the amount of
iGUPPI2u2,5 =
0.2× 1× 0.5 + 0.2× 1× 0.5× 0.5 + 0.2× 0.2× 0.5× 0.5
0.5
= 0.32 .
This value falls short of iGUPPI2u1,3, which we calculated above. The divergence relies also on
the fact that the manufacturer 4’s fixed coefficients with respect to its two inputs are different.
Because of this difference the recapture of upstream division u1 due to an increase in input
price w25 is less than the recapture of upstream division u2 due to an increase in input price
w13. Hence, the incentive of upstream division u2 to increase input price w
2
5 is less pronounced
than that of upstream division u1 to increase input price w13 .
Summing up, the above iGUPPI2 values indicate how strong the incentive of the vertically
integrated firms of our example is to increase their prices post-merger. If the merger does not
generate sizable cost efficiencies in the production of their outputs, their downstream divisions
have a strong incentive to increase their product prices. This would entail that the final
consumers become worse off after the merger. Moreover, the competitiveness of manufacturer
3 and 5 might be considerably deteriorating post-merger. Indeed, as displayed by the above
iGUPPI2u values, the highest upward pressure is on the input prices charged by the merged
firm to these manufacturers. It turns out that the marginal costs of producing the inputs
for manufacturer 3 and for manufacturer 5 has to decrease by 76 percent and 74 percent,
respectively, in order to prevent an increase in these prices. Interestingly, the impacts of
the merger on manufacturer 4 are ambiguous. Even if there are no cost efficiency gains in
the production of the inputs for manufacturer 4, the upstream division of merging partner 1
has a strong incentive to decrease the price of the input offered to this manufacturer. The
reason behind this downward pricing pressure is that the problem of double marginalization
with which the suppliers are faced pre-merger is eliminated by the merger. However, we also
have to keep in mind that the downward pricing pressure originating from the avoidance of
this problem is relatively weak for the upstream division of merging partner 2. Indeed, this
division might increase the price of the input offered to manufacturer 4 whenever it undergoes
no substantial cost efficiency gains in the production of this input after the merger.
6 Conclusions
This paper has extended the analysis of pricing pressure indices to the case of a merger between
two vertically integrated firms. Such mergers have been recently observed especially in the
telecommunication sector, e.g. the Telefo´nica Deutschland/E-Plus merger in 2014. To the
29
author’s best knowledge this paper is the first one which derives gross upward pricing pressure
indices for this important type of merger.
Our derivation is based on the model proposed by Moresi/Salop (2013). We consider a two-
stage differentiated Bertrand competition model with imperfect information. In this model,
there is supply chain with two value creation stages, the upstream stage and the downstream
stage. The upstream firms (i.e. the suppliers) set the prices of the intermediate goods used by
the downstream firms (i.e. the manufacturers) before the latter ones set the prices of the final
goods. While any non-integrated manufacturer is only informed about the prices of the inputs
it employs, the manufacturer of any vertically integrated firm knows all input prices charged
by the supplier of this firm. The pre-merger situation is assumed to be a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of this two-stage competition game.
Upward pricing pressure indices are aimed for quantifying the intensity of the incentive a
merged firm has to increase the prices of its products. The iGUPPI derived in this paper
measures this intensity for the case of a merger between two vertically integrated firms. For
such mergers, we identify two forces behind the upward pricing pressure, a horizontal pricing
pressure and a vertical pricing pressure. If a division of a merging partner increases the price of
its product, then the losses induced by this price increase are partly recaptured by the divisions
of the other merging partner. The horizontal pricing pressure results from the recapture of the
other merging partner’s corresponding division. The vertical pricing pressure results from the
recapture of the other merging partner’s lower-level or upper-level division.
Interestingly, our upwarding pricing pressure indices iGUPPId for the output prices prove to be
the sum of the GUPPI of Salop/Moresi (2009) and the vGUPPId of Moresi/Salop (2013). The first
one describes the horizontal upward pressure and the second one the vertical upward pressure
on the output prices set by the two vertically integrated merging partners. An important
conclusion of this decomposition is that whenever such a merger is mistakenly scrutinized by
either the GUPPI concept or the vGUPPId concept, the upward pressure on the output prices
might be underestimated.
Unlike iGUPPId, our upward pricing pressure indices iGUPPI
u for the input prices is not de-
composable in such a simple way a priori. In this case, it is justifiable to say that the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts. The reason is that an increase in an input price brings
about two price reactions in the downstream market, a price reaction of the non-integrated
manufacturer whose input has become more costly and a price reaction of the downstream
division of the merging partner whose upstream division has increased the input price. The
latter price reaction is incorporated neither in the GUPPI concept of Salop/Moresi (2009) nor in
the vGUPPIu concept of Moresi/Salop (2013). However, if the price reaction of the downstream
division is viewed as negligible, then our index iGUPPIu proves to be the sum of a multi-product
upstream market version of GUPPI and vGUPPIu.
The sign of our indices iGUPPId for the output prices are definitely positive owing to our
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assumption that the manufacturers produce imperfect substitutes. However, the sign of our
indices iGUPPIu for the input prices are ambiguous. The reason is that some manufactures
might employ their inputs in a complementary way. In the situation pre-merger, such produc-
tion processes give rise to the problem of double marginalization. The competing upstream
divisions of the vertically integrated firms are prompted to charge overly high input prices
being unfavorable for both of them. A merger eliminates this problem, unleashing a downward
pressure on the input prices. In some instances, this downward pricing pressure might outweigh
the opposite pricing pressures induced by the merger.
An interesting question we leave for future research is to find out how robust our upward
pricing pressure indices are with respect to the premises we have imposed on our competition
model. For example, one might examine how changes in the information structure or the
timing of the price-setting alter our index formulas. In this context, one could also abandon
our assumption that the downstream division of a vertically integrated firm sources all inputs
from its upstream division. Another issue future research might tackle is how our indices are
related to the prices prevailing post-merger. Shapiro (1996) has already addressed this issue
for the case of horizontal mergers. It turns out that the merged firm increases each of its
prices by 12(1−D)GUPPI percent whenever the merging partners i and j are confronted with the
same market conditions, i.e with the same constant marginal costs and with linear demand
functions so that the diversion ratios D := DRij = DRji between them are equal.
20 It might
be interesting to find out whether there exists an analogous relationship between the values of
our iGUPPI and the size of the price changes induced by a merger of vertically integrated firms.
As noted in the Introduction, Bergh et al. (2017) analyze the price effects of such a merger
in a specific market environment. It is an open question how their predicted price effects are
related to our iGUPPI.
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